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Abstract. In this paper, we present Zecale, a general purpose SNARK
proof aggregator that uses recursive composition of SNARKs. We start
by introducing the notion of recursive composition of SNARKs, before
introducing Zecale as a privacy preserving scalability solution. Then,
we list application types that can emerge and be built with Zecale.
Finally, we argue that such scalability solutions for privacy preserving
state transitions are paramount to emulate “cash” on blockchain systems.
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1 Introduction
As blockchain systems gained in popularity, several challenges have arisen re-
vealing some of the current limitations of the technology. While privacy is a
known issue on blockchains such as Bitcoin [Nak09] and Ethereum [But14], scal-
ability is another important concern. In fact, by their very nature of “append
only ledgers”, the more users transact on a blockchain, the more data is added
to the state over which validators reach consensus. This increase in blockchain
data, if not controlled, can lead to fewer validator nodes (and full nodes) yielding
more and more centralization in the system. In addition to that, sudden increase
in transaction volumes can dramatically inflate the transaction cost, as wit-
nessed in late 2017 after the raise in popularity of the CryptoKitties game1 that
congested the Ethereum network2 and triggered a sharp increase in gas price.
Even today, the important amount of transactions on public blockchains pushes
the fees up, making networks like Ethereum less attractive to certain users3.
Over the past years, several solutions have been developed in order to improve
blockchain scalability. Some approaches rely on a technique called “sharding”
which consists in splitting the entire state of the network into partitions denoted
1 https://www.cryptokitties.co/
2 https://www.coindesk.com/cat-fight-ethereum-users-clash-cryptokitties-congestion
3 See these tweets for instance: https://twitter.com/intocryptoast/
status/1263372756625702913?s=21, https://twitter.com/sassal0x/status/
1264555874992848898?s=21 or https://twitter.com/fennie_wang/status/
1266083935093583877?s=21 for instance.
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2 Antoine Rondelet
“shards”. Doing so allows to move away from the “all miners verify all trans-
actions” approach by having several network partitions validating transactions
concurrently [Jor18,Aut16]. Other projects such as Coda [BMRS20] introduce
the notion of “succinct blockchain”, which is built through the use of recursive
composition of SNARKs (see Section 3.2). In Coda the entire transaction history
is replaced by an argument4 of computational integrity certifying that the state
of the blockchain is valid. As such, any node willing to join the network only
needs to verify one (small) argument (a SNARK) instead of going through and
verifying the entire transaction history.
Similar techniques have been investigated to develop “layer 2” scaling solu-
tions on Ethereum, and constructions such as “ZK-Rollups” [Eth,Bar18,Lab19]
have gained tremendous interest5.
Finally, as witnessed in the Bitcoin community, relay networks have been de-
veloped as a way to improve blockchains scalability through better block propa-
gation [OABS19,BES16] (see also [Cor,Cor16]). In fact, in [OABS19] the authors
explain that the use of a relay network along blockchain systems like Bitcoin can
help improving the throughput of the system by shortening the block interval
— by speeding up the block propagation while avoiding an increase in the block
orphan rate. We note however, that, while improving the transaction processing
time, such solutions do not allow to reduce the size of the blockchain.
Our contribution. In this paper we present Zecale — a general purpose aggrega-
tor using recursive composition of SNARKs that allows to improve the scalabil-
ity of SNARK-based applications on Ethereum via aggregation of transactions
off-chain. We show how the privacy solution ZETH [RZ19] is complemented by
Zecale, and how both solutions can be used to implement digital cash systems.
To do so, we will consider the use of a relay network as a way to gain sender
anonymity when coupled with privacy-preserving protocols such as ZETH. Addi-
tionally, we will show how scaling solutions like Zecale can be deployed on nodes
constituting the relay network in order to off-load state transaction verification
work — normally carried out by miners — to relays, and thus enabling to keep
the transaction history and the blockchain data condensed.
We note that the focus of this study is articulated around the Ethereum [But14]
blockchain. Nevertheless, all results presented here are directly applicable to
blockchains supporting smart-contracts deployment and equipped with a Turing-
complete execution environment.
4 i.e. a computationally sound proof
5 While the name “zk-rollup” is wide-spread in the community, we find this name a
bit confusing. In fact, zero-knowledge is not strictly required (and generally not used
at all in “zk-rollup” projects). A better definition of “rollups” may be “proofs of
computational integrity of the verification of a set of transactions”, but this long
description diverges from the agreed upon and wide-spread terminology. As such,
we will stick to the agreed upon vocabulary and use the “zk-rollup” term in this
paper. We gently warn the reader than this term can be misleading.
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2 Background and Notations
Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time. Let λ ∈ N be the security pa-
rameter. We assume that all algorithms described receive as an implicit pa-
rameter the security parameter written in unary, 1λ. All algorithms are mod-
eled as Turing machines. An efficient algorithm is a probabilistic Turing ma-
chine running in polynomial time. All adversaries are modeled as efficient algo-
rithms. An adversary and all parties they control are denoted by letter A. We
write negl (resp. poly) to denote a negligible (resp. polynomial) function. Follow-
ing [Sho04,BR06], we structure security proofs as sequences of games. As such, we
say that the adversary wins game GAME defined on X if they make GAME return
1. We say that A wins GAME with negligible advantage if AdvgameA,X (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
By the expression |x| we denote the length of x if x is a string, the cardinality
of x if x is a set or the number of coordinates in x if x is a vector. We denote
by [n], n ∈ N the set {0, . . . , n− 1}. We represent string concatenation with the
|| : Λl × Λm → Λl+m infix operator, where Λ is an alphabet. Additionally, we
denote by x ← y the operation that assigns to x the value of y. Likewise, we
represent by x←$X the operation that assigns to x a value selected uniformly
at random from the finite set X.
Finally, we denote by [] : Sn × [n] → S the infix operator that takes a tuple
and an index as inputs and returns the element at the given index in the tuple.
We use the notation x[i] as syntactic sugar for x[]i (e.g. x← (A, 7, U), x[2] = U).
Bilinear groups. Let G be a bilinear group generator taking 1λ as input and
returning a tuple (r,G1,G2,GT , e), where G1,G2,GT are cyclic groups of prime
order r, and e is a map e : G1 × G2 → GT , such that e is non-degenerate and
bilinear. We further assume that arithmetic in the groups and computing e is
efficient, that G1 6= G2, and that there does not exist efficiently computable
homomorphisms between the two source groups (pairing of type III [GPS08]).
We denote by g1, g2, gT the generators of the groups G1,G2,GT respectively. We
denote by + the group operation in the two source groups G1,G2. Additionally,
we define the infix operator · : Fr × G1,2 → G1,2 that represents the successive
application of the group operation - e.g. k ·g1 = g1+· · ·+g1 (k times). The group
operation for the target group GT is denoted by ∗, and the “exponentiation”
operator :ˆ GT × Fr denotes its successive application - e.g. gT k = gT ∗ . . . ∗ gT
(k times).
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Brief overview of IP, NIZK and SNARK
In contrast with standard mathematical proofs, Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff
introduced the notion of zero-knowledge proofs. These proofs enable a prover
P to prove a theorem to a verifier V without revealing anything other than the
fact that the theorem is correct [GMR85].
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In their seminal work, the authors focused on interactive protocols, where
both P and V are modeled as interactive Turing machines communicating by
sharing their reading and writing tapes. In brief, an interactive proof is a proce-
dure by which a prover wants to prove a theorem to a verifier. To that end, the
verifier is allowed to flip coins, and use these coin flips to ask questions (i.e. “send
challenges”) to the prover. The prover answers the verifier’s questions, and after
several interactions, the verifier either accepts or rejects the theorem.
Informally, the complexity class admitting interactive proofs (IP) is defined
as the class of languages L with the following properties:
Completeness:
∃P s.t. Pr
[
V.Vf(x, pi) = true
∣∣∣∣∣ x ∈ Lpi ← Transcript(P,V)
]
≥ 2
3
Soundness:
∀P, Pr
[
V.Vf(x, pi) = true
∣∣∣∣∣ x 6∈ Lpi ← Transcript(P,V)
]
≤ 1
3
where Transcript(P,V) is the set of messages exchanged between the prover
and the verifier, and where Vf is the verification algorithm ran by the verifier
to either accept or reject x. Note that interaction is a very efficient tool for
soundness amplification as multiple executions of an interactive protocol can be
used to bring the soundness error down6.
Informally, we say that the protocol is zero-knowledge if the verifier only
learns the validity of the theorem being proven and nothing else.
Importantly, the notion of IP as per [GMR85] does not make any computa-
tional assumption on the prover (modeled as “all powerful”), while the verifier
is assumed to have limited resources (i.e. be PPT). Likewise, the computational
model assumes that both P and V have a random tape, but that the verifier’s
coin flips are private (i.e. private coin).
This restriction on coin tosses contrasts with the notion of Arthur-Merlin
(AM) protocols introduced by Babai [Bab85,BM88], in which the verifier’s coin
tosses are public, and thus accessible to the prover. In fact, in this model all the
verifier’s messages can be replaced by the output of a random beacon [Rab83]
for instance. Shortly after, Goldwasser and Sipser [GS89] showed however, that
“private coin tossing” is no stronger than “public coin tossing” and their work
led to the well acclaimed IP = AM result.
Interestingly, Shamir showed that IP = PSPACE [Sha92], demonstrating the
great power of randomness and communication7. While IP is demonstrated to
be a wide complexity class8, Goldreich and Oren showed [Ore87,GO94] that re-
6 k repetitions allow to bound the soundness error by 1
3k
7 a simplified proof was published by Shen [She92]
8 we know that NP ⊆ PSPACE
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moving interactions between prover and verifier while preserving zero-knowledge
yields a collapse to BPP in the plain model.9
As a way to compensate the removal of interactions, Blum, Feldman and Mi-
cali [BFM88], and then Blum, De Santis, Micali and Persiano [BSMP91] stud-
ied the notion of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, in which prover/verifier
communications and randomness are substituted by a shared common random
string. This setting, generalized to the common reference string (CRS) model,
and declined in various flavors where, for example, the reference string is as-
sumed to have a specific structure10, has been used to design a wide range of
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems (NIZK).
We further note that, moving to the non-interactive setting allows to obtain
publicly verifiable proofs, which is of great interest for various cryptographic
applications (e.g. blockchain protocols).
SNARK. We now focus on zk-SNARKs, a special type of NIZK. Informally, a
(zero-knowledge) Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (SNARK),
is a small proof of knowledge, which is non-interactive and sound against compu-
tationally bounded adversaries. Not surprisingly, the appealing performances of
NIZKs like SNARKs take their source in the shift from an “all powerful prover”
(like in IP) to a “computationally restricted” prover; allowing protocol designers
to rely on cryptographic assumptions to design efficient protocols.
The first known SNARK construction, proposed by Micali [Mic94] coined
Computationally Sound (CS) Proofs is based on Kilian’s construction [Kil92] and
proven secure in the Random Oracle model. Following, various SNARK construc-
tions have been established over the past decades (e.g [GGPR13,Gro10,Lip12]).
While different SNARK constructions offer different trade-offs, we will be fo-
cusing here on the pairing-based SNARK construction [Gro16] “compiled from”
Linear Interactive Proofs (LIP) as proposed by Bitansky et al. [BCI+13].
Remark 1. Our focus on [Gro16] is justified by the fact that this scheme admits
very small arguments (3 group elements), which, when used along a blockchain
system, allows to minimize the size of the transactions. We note however that
our result can be used with any other “NP-complete” SNARK schemes.
Below, we provide an informal definition of a SNARK, and invite the reader
to consult e.g. [GM17] for precise definitions.
Informal definition of SNARKs. Let R ⊂ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ be a polynomial-time
decidable binary relation. We assume that λ is explicitly deductible from the
description of R. Let L = {x | ∃w s.t. R(x,w)} be the NP language defined by R.
9 note that the word “collapse” here reflects our current understanding of the com-
plexity class hierarchy. In fact, the relation between P and BPP and the relation
between P and NP is not yet fully understood. As of today, it is believed that
P = BPP [Gol11,IW97,CRT98] and that P 6= NP.
10 in which case we talk about “Structured Reference String” (SRS)
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Here, x is the instance11 and w is the witness. Roughly speaking, Ψ is a publicly
verifiable zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zk-
SNARK) if Ψ comports four PPT algorithms KGen,P,V,Sim such that:
CRS generator: KGen is a PPT algorithm that takes an NP-relation R as
input, runs a one time setup routine, and outputs a common reference string
(CRS) crs for this relation along with a trapdoor td.
Prover: P is a PPT algorithm that given (crs, x,w), such that (x,w) ∈ R, out-
puts an argument pi.
Verifier: V is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, x, pi) returns either 0 (reject)
or 1 (accept).
Simulator: Sim is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, td, x) outputs an argu-
ment pi.
We require a proof system Ψ to have the following four properties:
Completeness: Ψ is complete if an honest verifier accepts a proof made by an
honest prover. That is, the verifier accepts a proof made for (x,w) ∈ R.
Knowledge soundness: Ψ is knowledge-sound if from an acceptable proof pi
for instance x it is feasible for a specialized algorithm called extractor to
extract a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R.12
Zero knowledge: Ψ is zero-knowledge if for any x ∈ L no adversary can dis-
tinguish a proof made by an honest prover on input (crs, x,w) from a proof
made by the simulator on input (crs, x, td) but no witness w.
Succinctness: Ψ is succinct if the proof pi is sub-linear in the size of the instance
and witness.
We note that despite knowledge soundness being stronger than “plain” sound-
ness, it is sometimes still too weak of a notion to satisfy the requirements nec-
essary to deploy a scheme in real world systems. In fact, knowledge-soundness
does not protect against Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks where an adver-
sary can forge an acceptable SNARK after seeing a set of acceptable arguments.
In other words, knowledge soundness does not ensure that the SNARK is non-
malleable. Recent zk-SNARKs such as [GM17,BG18] comply with a strong no-
tion of soundness – simulation extractability (or simulation knowledge sound-
ness) [Sah99,SCO+01] – which prevents MiTM attacks, and which is desirable in
many real life applications. SNARKs satisfying the property below are referred
to as SE-SNARKs:
Simulation extractability: Ψ is simulation-extractable if from any proof pi
for instance x output by an adversary with access to an oracle producing
simulated proof on given inputs, it is possible for an extractor to extract a
witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ R.
11 also referred to as “public/primary input”
12 note that “knowledge soundness” ⇒ “soundness”.
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3.2 Recursive composition of SNARKs
As we know that SNARKs like [Gro16] can be used to generate arguments for any
NP statements (i.e. x ∈ L, where L is an NP language), and since we know that
the verification algorithm ran by the verifier V is itself in NP, one can wonder
if it is possible to generate an argument certifying that another argument has
correctly been verified. In other words, is it possible to generate a proof that
another proof has correctly been checked?13
This question was first studied by Valiant [Val08] who proposed composable
proofs of knowledge as a way to achieve Incrementally Verifiable Computation
(IVC). Further, Bitansky, Canetti, Chiesa and Tromer introduced the notion of
Proof Carrying Data [CT10], along with a “boostrapping” technique [BCCT13]
to obtain complexity-preserving SNARKs allowing to recursively compose proofs.
The first practical instantiation of recursive (pairing-based) SNARK composi-
tion was achieved by Ben-Sasson et al. [BCTV17] using cycles of MNT elliptic
curves [MNT01] as further studied by Chiesa et al. [CCW19]. Informally, using
special tuples of elliptic curves such as cycles (see [SS11,CCW19] for formal def-
initions) allows to remove overhead due to finite field characteristic mismatch,
and allows to achieve “infinite recursive SNARK composition”14
Recent work such as [BCG+18] showed that bounded recursion was sufficient
to build meaningful applications. In their construction, the authors introduced a
pairing-friendly amicable chain of elliptic curve instantiated as (BLS12-377,CP),
where CP is obtained via the Cocks-Pinch method [CP01] (see [FST10, Section
4.1]). A more efficient instantiation of the chain was later proposed by El Housni
and Guillevic [HG20].
3.3 Ethereum
In the following, we assume familiarity with blockchain systems, and more pre-
cisely Ethereum. We refer the reader to [But14], or [Woo] for an introduction.
4 Zecale
4.1 Motivations
Despite their broad interest, blockchain systems are often criticized for their in-
ability to “scale”. Unfortunately, multi-dimensional notions like scalability are
often simplified to simple metrics such as Transactions Per Second (TPS). Such
simplifications turn the “blockchain scalability problem” into a TPS maximiza-
tion problem that fails to capture the true nature of the issue.
13 In the following we will use “proof” and “argument” interchangeably to denote
computationally sound proofs.
14 it is possible to generate a proof A that another proof B was correctly verified, where
B is itself a proof that another proof C was correctly verified, where C is itself a
proof that another proof D was verified etc.
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What does scalability mean in the context of blockchain systems? Answering
this question is fundamental to frame the problem that needs to be solved. Well
established payment systems can support thousands of transactions per second,
and are systematically used as comparison point to assess the performances of
blockchains. Importantly, however, the value proposition of blockchain systems
lies in their decentralized nature. As such, keeping the network as decentralized
as possible by preserving the network’s performances under addition of new
nodes in the distributed system is paramount.
Hence, a scalable blockchain system is one that can support a large number
of users (high throughput/TPS), as well as a large number of untrusted validator
nodes (highly decentralized). This raises the following paradox:
Intuitively, maximizing TPS necessitates to produce more transactions (data)
that are processed by the system. However, maximizing the number of vali-
dating nodes on the system requires to keep the hardware requirements – to
run a node – (bandwidth, processing, storage) as low as possible, and thus
requires to keep the amount of data, produced and processed, as small as
possible.
In the following, we refer to a “scalable blockchain” as one that implements
the right trade-offs allowing to maximize the combination of all scalability pa-
rameters.
The cost of privacy. Another long standing issue with blockchains is the lack
of privacy. In fact, because of their very nature of “append only” distributed
ledgers, all transactions need to be validated by all miners. As commonly as-
sumed, the transaction data needs to be visible to carry out the verification,
which roughly means that sender, recipient and amount of a transaction need
to be “in the clear” to keep the system sound. Protocols such as Zerocash/Z-
cash [BCG+14,HBHW16], however, contrast with approaches relying on trans-
parency for security, and rather propose to rely on zk-SNARKs as a way to
prove that transactions “follow the rules of the system” without disclosing their
attributes.
Recently, Rondelet and Zajac [RZ19] leveraged the (quasi15) Turing-complete
smart-contract platform of Ethereum as a way to encode a privacy preserving
state transition similar to Zerocash. However, and not surprisingly, privacy pre-
serving state transitions like ZETH [RZ19] are significantly more expensive (gas-
wise) to carry out than plain Ethereum transactions.16 This is partially due
to high storage requirements on the smart-contract, and the necessity to carry
out multiple cryptographic checks as part of the state transition. Like most
SNARK-based applications, one check carried out during the state transition
15 due to the need to pay gas for each operations on the Ethereum state, and due to
the block gas limit, it is clear that one can easily come up with a state transition
that cannot be executed on Ethereum (either because the cost of carrying out the
state transition is bigger than the block gas limit, or because the cost of the state
transition is bigger than the current supply of Ether)
16 this is not surprising. Indistinguishability has a price.
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is the verification of the SNARK proof pi for the base application statement
(e.g. ZETH).
The common framework for SNARK-based layer 2 applications (i.e. smart-
contract) is to:
1. Verify the SNARK proof
2. If the SNARK proof verification is successful, then, execute the state transi-
tion specified by the application logic (e.g. carry out changes in the blockchain
state etc.)
Implementing complex smart-contract logic may require to pass a lot of data
as input to the smart contract. This means, broadcasting big transactions and
blocks on the peer-to-peer network and processing big pieces of data as part
of the block mining process. This exacerbates the “scalability paradox” above-
mentioned.
Scalable privacy. Zecale aims to lessen the impact of privacy preserving state
transitions like ZETH on the overall system, by minimizing the amount of data
sent and processed on-chain. To do this, Zecale off-loads the verification of all
zk-SNARK proofs of an application to a piece of software called the aggregator.
This software component uses recursive proof composition in order to generate
a proof of computational integrity certifying that all zk-SNARK proofs have
correctly been verified off-chain. This proof is then sent on-chain along with
the instances associated with the aggregated proofs. This unique proof is then
verified on-chain, and each primary inputs are processed according to the as-
sociated verification bit. This technique allows to aggregate N SNARK proofs
into a single one, and allows to send a unique transaction on-chain, without
altering the soundness of the system – the system remains sound as long as
the SNARK-scheme is secure (see Section 4.6 for more details). This idea is
summarized Fig. 1
4.2 Technique
As above-mentioned, Zecale leverages recursive proof composition in order to
delegate the individual SNARK proof verification to an off-chain software com-
ponent – the aggregator (see Fig. 2). The proof generated by the aggregator is
then sent on-chain, along with the primary inputs of all verified proofs in order
to execute the state transitions on the state machine (e.g. Ethereum). Since the
proof generated by the aggregator is verified on-chain by all miners, only “one
level of recursion” is needed in Zecale. This is similar to [BCG+18] in that
regard.
As a consequence, we propose to use a pairing-friendly amicable chain as a
way to implement efficient bounded recursion and bypass several open problems
(see [CCW19]) and inefficiencies related to the use of low embedding degree
cycles of elliptic curves17.
17 if the embedding degrees of the curves are small, then dlog and pairing-based hard-
ness assumptions need to be enforced via the use of prime fields with larger char-
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IncludeTxInBlock({zktxi}i∈[N ])
1 : for i ∈ [N ] do
2 : if ¬Ψ.V(crsapp, zktxi.pi, zktxi.x) then
3 : abort
4 : else
5 : ExecAppLogic(zktxi.x)
6 : endif
7 : endfor
IncludeTxInBlock(aggrtx)
1 : if ¬Ψ.V(crszec, aggrtx.pi, aggrtx.x) then
2 : abort
3 : endif
4 : for i ∈ |aggrtx.inputs| do
5 : ExecAppLogic(aggrtx.inputs[i])
6 : endfor
Fig. 1: Left: transaction execution routine without Zecale. A set of transac-
tions are processed, all transactions contain a zk-SNARK proof that needs to
be verified. Right: transaction execution routine when Zecale is used. Only one
transaction – and SNARK proof – is processed. N represents the maximum num-
ber of zktx that can be included in a block, where zktx is a transaction containing
a SNARK.
Fig. 2: Simplified representation of the Zecale aggregator
The use of the chain of elliptic curves allows us to generate a set of “nested”
zk-SNARKs over the first curve, and to generate a “wrapping” SNARK18 –
proving correct verification of the set of nested zk-SNARKs – over the second
curve. As such, it is required that all SNARK-based applications aiming to be
used along with Zecale generate zk-SNARK proofs over the first curve of the
pairing-friendly amicable chain used. The authors of ZEXE [BCG+18] initially
proposed a chain instantiated by a curve from the BLS12 family (BLS12-377) and
a curve generated using the Cocks-Pinch method. A more efficient instantiation
made of BLS12-377 and a Brezing-Weng [BW05] curve – denoted BW6-761 –
was recently proposed by El Housni and Guillevic [HG20]. Any such 2-chain
(resp. cycle) of pairing-friendly elliptic curves can be used in Zecale. We propose
acteristics which renders group and field operations less efficient since more “limbs”
are needed to represent the algebraic structures’ elements.
18 note that this proof is not zero-knowledge
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to use (BLS12-377,BW6-761) as it reflects the state of the art at the time of
writing.
4.3 Zecale language
In order to provably verify each individual “nested” zk-SNARK proofs, it is
necessary to encode the SNARK verification algorithm of the base application
(i.e. Ψapp.V) in the correct form: one allowing to efficiently generate a proof
of computational integrity of the execution of the algorithm. This way to en-
code machine computation so that its correctness can easily be verified via few
probabilistic algebraic checks is called arithmetization. SNARKs such as [Gro16]
use a type of arithmetization called Quadratic Arithmetic Programs (QAPs)
introduced in [GGPR13]. While describing the full set of algebraic constraints
encoding the SNARK verification algorithm as an arithmetic circuit – defined
over a finite field – is outside of the scope of this paper, we provide below a
high-level description of the NP-relation (Rzec) characterizing the language of
Zecale denoted Lzec. This is summarized Fig. 3
Let BATCH SIZE be a fixed protocol parameter representing the size of the batch of
nested proofs.
ZecaleRelation(xzec, (crsapp, {(piappi, xappi)}i∈[BATCH SIZE]))
for i ∈ [BATCH SIZE] do
bi ← Ψapp.V(crsapp, piappi, xappi)
endfor
xzec =
∑
i∈[BATCH SIZE] bi · 2i
where Ψapp.V is the SNARK verification algorithm associated with the SNARK
scheme used in the base application. For [Gro16], this algorithm consists in
carrying out the check:
e(pi.A, pi.B)
?
= e(vk.α, vk.β) ∗ e(∑|x|i=0 xi vk.β·ui(x)+vk.α·vi(x)+wi(x)vk.γ , vk.γ) ∗ e(pi.C, vk.δ),
where vk is the part of the crs used by the verifier.
Fig. 3: Pseudo-code representation of the set of constraints that all pairs of inputs
(x, w) need to satisfy to belong to Rzec
The attentive reader may realize that the verification check of Groth16 as de-
scribed in Fig. 3 is linear with the number of public inputs. As multiple SNARK-
based applications may have different number of primary inputs, one needs to
overcome some challenges in order to enable the Zecale relation to be generic
enough to be used along with a wide class of SNARK-based applications. In fact,
it is important to remember that Groth16 can be used to prove any statement
in NP (due to the NP-completeness of QAPs), but a new setup phase needs to
be ran for each new language, posing some practical challenges.
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Fortunately, the authors of [GGPR13] proposed a “trick” to break the lin-
ear complexity of the SNARK verification check by simply applying an ordinary
(i.e. not extractable) collision-resistant hash function to the statement. We follow
the same approach and propose to extend the NP-relations of all base applica-
tions — that aim to be used with Zecale — with this additional hashing step
to reduce the number of their primary inputs to the same constant.
To simplify notations in the following sections, we define, for each prime
p and hash function H, the following constant InpNb = dlh/(blog2(p)c+ 1)e,
where lh is the digest length of H. Moreover, we introduce the two following
functions: toFieldH,p : {0, 1}lh → (Fp)InpNb which takes a hash digest and returns
its “prime field representation”19 (the function is injective, i.e. if lh > blog2(p)c+
1, toFieldH,p returns the tuple of elements in Fp necessary to uniquely represent
the digest “in the field”), and toDigestH,p : (Fp)InpNb → {0, 1}lh defined such
that for all digests h of H, we have toDigestH,p(toFieldH,p(h)) = h. Finally, Frn
(resp. Frw ) is the scalar field of the first (resp. second) curve of the 2-chain we
use.
Using these additional notations, we represent the “generic” Zecale rela-
tion Fig. 4.
Let BATCH SIZE be a fixed protocol parameter representing the size of the batch of
nested proofs.
ZecaleRelation(xzec, (crsapp, {(piappi, xappi)}i∈[BATCH SIZE]))
for i ∈ [BATCH SIZE] do
/ As assumed, the relation of the base application uses
/ H to do the “hashing trick” described in [GGPR13].
/ Here xappi represents the “non-hashed” instance that
/ we now hash to verify the nested SNARK.
xzec.xHi = toFieldH,rn (H(xappi))
bi ← Ψapp.V(crsapp, piappi, xzec.xHi)
endfor
xzec.xValid =
∑
i∈[BATCH SIZE] bi · 2i
xzec.vkHash = toFieldH,rw (H(crsapp))
Fig. 4: Pseudo-code representation of the generic Zecale relation
In the rest of the document, we use Rzec to refer to the NP-relation de-
scribed Fig. 4
19 Converting a bit string to a field element can be done by taking the sum of all ith bits
of the string multiplied by 2i, e.g. (110101)2 is represented by (
∑
i∈[|(110)|](110)[i] ·
2i,
∑
i∈[|(101)|](101)[i] · 2i) = (6, 5) ∈ (F7)2
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A note on zero-knowledge. Since the Zecale aggregator generates a “wrapping”
proof to certify the correct verification of a set of “nested” proofs, it is not
necessary for the “wrapping” proof to be zero-knowledge. In fact, if “nested”
SNARKs already are zero-knowledge, there is no additional security gain to also
enforce zero-knowledge for the “wrapping” proof. As such, the randomization
steps carried out by the prover P, during the proof generation, to protect against
malicious verifiers, and ensure zero-knowledge, can be omitted. This allows to
fasten the aggregator algorithm by removing unnecessary operations.
A note on batch verification. A well known method to fasten the verification of a
set of SNARKs is to use batching techniques. While it may be tempting to modify
the NP-relation Rzec Fig. 4 to generate a proof of correct batch verification
of a set of zk-proofs, this approach presents a set of practical limitations. We
investigate the case of batch verification in more details in Appendix A and
Appendix B.
4.4 Smart-contract logic
In addition to generate SNARK proofs for statements of the form x ∈ Lzec,
Zecale requires some smart-contract logic to function. In fact, after aggregating
all the base application’s zk-SNARKs, it is necessary to verify the “wrapping”
proof on-chain, and execute the base application logic for all the primary inputs
associated with valid “nested” proofs.
The smart-contract specifying the set of Zecale state transitions uses a dis-
patch mechanism that forwards the set of instances – associated to valid proofs
– to the base application contract that will then process them by executing the
base application logic on the state machine.
We provide Fig. 6 a pseudo-code description of the processAggrTx function
representing the logic of the smart-contract ˜ZecaleC specifying Zecale state
transitions. Furthermore, we represent Fig. 5 the difference between a stand-
alone base-application and one used along with Zecale.
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˜baseAppC.constructor(crsapp, . . .)
1 : / 1. Write the CRS in the storage
2 : storage[“app crs”]← crsapp
3 : / 2. Execute further
4 : / application-specific logic
5 : . . .
6 : return
7 :
8 :
˜baseAppC.processTx(piapp, xapp)
1 : / 1. Check that the primary inputs
2 : / are in the proper scalar field
3 : if xapp 6∈ (Frn )|xapp|
4 : abort
5 : endif
6 : / 2. Verify the SNARK
7 : crs← storage[“app crs”]
8 : if ¬Ψapp.V(crs, piapp, xapp) :
9 : abort
10 : endif
11 : / 3. Execute the application logic
12 : ExecAppLogic(xapp)
13 : return 1
˜ZbaseAppC.constructor(crsapp, zecaleAddr, . . .)
1 : / 1. Write the hash of the CRS in the storage
2 : storage[“app crs”]← H(crsapp)
3 : / 2. Write the address of the Zecale contract
4 : / in the storage
5 : storage[“zecale addr”]← zecaleAddr
6 : / 3. Execute further application-specific logic
7 : . . .
8 : return
˜ZbaseAppC.dispatch(vkHash, byteData)
1 : / 1. Check that the caller is the registered
2 : / Zecale contract
3 : if ¬ msgSender = storage[“zecale addr”]
4 : abort
5 : endif
6 : / 2. Check that the received inputs are for
7 : / the right language
8 : if ¬ toDigestH,rw (vkHash) = storage[“app crs”]
9 : abort
10 : endif
11 : decodedData← decodeBytes(byteData)
12 : / 3. Check that the primary inputs are in
13 : / the proper scalar field
14 : if decodedData 6∈ (Frn )|decodedData|
15 : abort
16 : endif
17 : / 4. Execute the base application logic
18 : for i ∈ [|decodedData|] do
19 : ExecAppLogic(decodedData[i])
20 : endfor
21 : return 1
Fig. 5: Left: Pseudo-code of the state transition of a stand-alone SNARK-based
application. Right: Pseudo-code of the state transition of a SNARK-based ap-
plication implementing the “dispatch mechanism” to be used with Zecale.
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˜ZecaleC.processAggrTx(pizec, xzec, {xappi}i∈[BATCH SIZE],ZbaseAppAddr)
1 : / 1. Check the inputs before carrying out any expensive computation
2 : if xzec.xValid >
∑
i∈[BATCH SIZE] 2
i then
3 : abort
4 : endif
5 : / Make sure that the application inputs have not been maliciously
6 : / tampered with by the Zecale aggregator
7 : for i ∈ [BATCH SIZE] do
8 : if ¬ [xzec.xHi = toFieldH,rn (H(xappi))] then
9 : abort
10 : endif
11 : endfor
12 : / 2. Check the aggregation/wrapping SNARK
13 : if ¬Ψzec.V(crszec, pizec, xzec) = true then :
14 : abort
15 : endif
16 : / 3. Execute the base application state transitions
17 : / 3.1 If none of the nested proofs are correct, there is nothing to dispatch
18 : if xzec.xValid = 0
19 : abort
20 : endif
21 : / 3.2 Otherwise, dispatch the instances associated with the valid nested proofs
22 : dispatchData← {0}BATCH SIZE
23 : for i ∈ [BATCH SIZE] do
24 : if xzec.xValid & 0x1 then
25 : dispatchData[i]← xappi
26 : endif
27 : / Right shift by 1 position
28 : shr(xzec.xValid, 1)
29 : endfor
30 : ˜ZbaseAppC← createContractInstance(ZbaseAppAddr)
31 : byteData← encodeToBytes(dispatchData)
32 : ˜ZbaseAppC.dispatch(xzec.vkHash, byteData)
33 : return 1
Fig. 6: Pseudo-code specifying the Zecale state transition
In brief, the Zecale state transition can be decomposed into 3 steps:
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Check the inputs: As nested proofs are verified off-chain, it is important to
make sure that the instances of the nested proofs, forwarded on-chain by
the aggregator to execute the base application logic, are the same as the one
used during the off-chain “nested” proof verification. In other words, it is key
to make sure that the base application state transition processes the “right
instances” (instances that haven’t been tampered with by the aggregator).20.
Likewise, we check that xzec.xValid ∈ [
∑
i∈[BATCH SIZE] 2
i] in order to abort the
state transition as soon as possible if not the case.
Verify the aggregation SNARK proof: Once the inputs are checked to be
of the right form, the wrapping proof is verified. If the proof verifies cor-
rectly, then network participants have overwhelming confidence that the set
of nested proofs have correctly been verified off-chain.
Forward the application data to the base application: The base applica-
tion verifies that:
– The calling contract is the genuine Zecale contract — to be sure that
all necessary checks have successfully been carried out.
– The received data is made of instances for this application.
Finally, the base application logic is executed. Note however, that we have
explicitly represented the check that consists in verifying that all instances
(xapp) associated to valid nested SNARKs lie in the right finite field. In fact,
failure to do such a check can expose the underlying application to modular
arithmetic-based attacks like [Sem19].
Example 1. Let BATCH SIZE = 3, xzec.xValid = 5, and let (xapp0, xapp1, xapp2) be
the application instances. Since the size of the proofs batch is 3, at most 3 zk-
SNARKs are valid. As such xzec.xValid is bounded by (111)2 = 7. We check that
xzec.xValid < 7, which is satisfied here. The binary representation of xzec.xValid is
(101)2. As such, the nested zk-SNARKs at indices 0 and 2 in the batch verified
correctly, while the proof at index 1 was deemed incorrect by the verification
algorithm. This means that, out of the tuple of instances (xapp0, xapp1, xapp2),
only dispatchData ← (xapp0, xapp2) will be forwarded to the base application
contract to be processed (e.g. added to the Merkle tree of commitments etc. if
the base application is ZETH).
4.5 Instantiation of the SNARK scheme
Despite the fact that Groth16 is not universal [GKM+18] and only weakly simula-
tion extractable [KV20], it remains of broad interest in applied settings because
of its nearly optimal argument size and efficiency.
As our main focus is to minimize the size of data exchanged and processed by
miners while keeping the cost of the Zecale state transition as small as possible,
20 note that further security checks need to be enforced at the base application layer
to prevent front-running and malleability issues in the context of a malicious aggre-
gator (see Section 5.3 for more context, and [CR20] for an example of non-malleable
construction)
Zecale: Reconciling Privacy and Scalability on Ethereum 17
we believe that Groth16 is a good candidate to instantiate the SNARK scheme
used in Zecale.
It is important to note, however, that recent proof systems such as, e.g. [GWC19,CHM+20]
could also be used to instantiate the SNARK scheme used in Zecale. Likewise,
there are no requirements to use the same proof system in Zecale and in the
base application. For instance, it is feasible for ZETH to use Groth16, while gen-
erating Zecale wrapping proofs can be done using another proof system, such
as [GM17] for instance.
4.6 Security
In the following, we prove that Zecale is secure. Namely, we show that the
protocol preserves the soundness of the underlying blockchain system.
To study the soundness of Zecale we want to show that the probability that
an adversary A can use Zecale in order to break the soundness of a ledger L is
negligible in λ. We do so by defining the soundness game ZCL-SND below, and
argue that the probability of winning this game (also referred to as Advzcl-sndA,L (λ))
is negligible.
We denote by APPS a set of applications deployed on L during the execution
of the Setup algorithm. In the following, an application app will be represented
by a tuple (crsapp, baseAppAddr,ZbaseAppAddr). Moreover, we denote by I =
Πχ, |I| = |χ| = |Π| = BATCH SIZE the set of pairs of SNARKs proofs generated
with Ψapp (Π), and associated set of primary inputs (χ). We denote by  the
operator that takes two ordered sets of same cardinality as input and builds a
resulting set which ith element is the pair of the ith elements of the input sets.
Furthermore, S ⊂ χ.
ZCL-SND(λ)
(crszec,L,APPS)← Setup(λ)
state← AOL,Ψapp,Ψzec (crszec,APPS)
capp←$ APPS
(pizec, xzec, I,S)← AO
L,Ψapp,Ψzec
(crszec,APPS, state, capp)
b← ZecaleP(crszec, pizec, xzec, χ,S, capp.ZbaseAppAddr) ∧
[∃xi ∈ S, (pii, xi) ∈ I, ¬BaseAppP(pii, xi, capp.baseAppAddr)]
return b
In the game above, A can do 2 types of oracle queries to the ledger L:
– processTx which takes (pi, x, baseAppAddr), and which execute the function
processTx of ˜baseAppC at address baseAppAddr on input (pi, x).
– processAggrTx which takes (pizec, xzec, {xi}i∈[BATCH SIZE],ZbaseAppAddr) as in-
puts and executes the function processAggrTx of the contract ˜ZecaleC on
the same inputs.
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Likewise A is allowed to do oracle queries to generate “nested” (resp. “wrap-
ping”) proofs — i.e. call Ψapp.P (resp. Ψzec.P) — and verify them — i.e. execute
Ψapp.V (resp. Ψzec.V):
– genNestedProof: takes (crs, x,w) as input, where crs is the CRS of one of the
applications in APPS, and returns the output of Ψapp.P(crs, x,w).
– verifNestedProof: takes (crs, pi, x) as input, where crs is the CRS of one of the
applications in APPS, and returns the output of Ψapp.V(crs, pi, x).
– genWrappingProof: takes (xzec, crs, {pii, xi}i∈[BATCH SIZE]) as input, where crs is
the CRS of one of the applications in APPS, and returns the output of
Ψzec.P(crszec, xzec, (crs, {pii, xi}i∈[BATCH SIZE])).
– verifWrappingProof: takes (crszec, pizec, xzec) as input, and returns the output
of Ψzec.V(crszec, pizec, xzec).
In the game ZCL-SND, ZecaleP(crszec, pizec, xzec, χ,S,ZbaseAppAddr) is the
predicate that returns true if the value of decodedData (see line 18 in the dispatch
function Fig. 5) equals S when ˜ZecaleC.processAggrTx is called on (pizec, xzec, χ,
ZbaseAppAddr), and returns false otherwise.
Moreover, BaseAppP(pii, xi, baseAppAddr) is the predicate that returns true if
˜baseAppC.processTx(pii, xi), where ˜baseAppC is the application contract at
address baseAppAddr, returns 1. This predicate returns false in all other cases.
All in all, winning the game above means that the adversary used Zecale as
a way to carry out changes in the ledger L’s state that should not have been done
by only using the stand-alone base application contract (i.e. without Zecale).
Theorem 1. Let A be a PPT adversary. If H is a collision-resistant hash func-
tion (i.e. Advcoll-resA,H (λ) ≤ f(λ), f negligible)21, and if Ψzec is a sound SNARK
scheme (i.e. Advsnark-sndA,Ψzec (λ) ≤ g(λ), g negligible), then Advzcl-sndA,L (λ) ≤ negl(λ).
Proof. LetX = (crszec, pizec, xzec, χ,S, capp.ZbaseAppAddr) be such that ZecaleP(X) =
true. Additionally, let I,S ⊂ χ be such that ∃xi ∈ S, (pii, xi) ∈ I, ¬BaseAppP(pii,
xi, capp.baseAppAddr).
By looking at ˜baseAppC (see Fig. 5), we see that for BaseAppP(pii, xi,
capp.baseAppAddr) to return false, at least one of the two predicates below needs
to be not satisfied:
(E1) xappi ∈ (Frn)|xappi|
(E2) Ψapp.V(crsapp, pii, xi)
We study the probability of these two events below.
(E1) Since the ZecaleP predicate was satisfied (by assumption), this means that
the check decodedData ∈ (Frn)|decodedData| was satisfied. The probability to
satisfy this check on Zecale while not satisfying it on the base application
contract is 0 (the same check is done on both ˜ZbaseAppC and ˜baseAppC).
21 Note that the requirement on toField being an injective map is important, as it allows
to be sure that the function is not a “source of collisions”.
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(E2) We distinguish three cases for which ZecaleP can return true, yet one of the
BaseAppP predicates returns false because the SNARK verification check
Ψapp.V(crsapp, pii, xi) is not satisfied:
A. pizec ← Ψzec.P(crszec, xzec, crsapp, I), where I is a set containing proof/in-
stance pairs for capp, but where at least one proof (pii) in the set is not
valid (i.e. xi 6∈ Lcapp), and its associated instance is in S. For ZecaleP
to be true, and since the invalid instance was included in S, this means
that the associated invalid proof was deemed valid since the check on
xValid in Rzec was successful. Since the proof was correctly rejected on
BaseAppP, this means that the SNARK Ψzec is not sound since the state-
ment xzec ∈ Lzec was deemed correct while in reality xzec 6∈ Lzec. We
denote the probability of this event by Advsnark-sndA,Ψzec (λ).
B. pizec ← Ψzec.P(crszec, xzec, crsa˜pp, I), where I is a set containing only valid
proof/instance pairs for a˜pp, where a˜pp 6= capp. In this case, it is also
clear that BaseAppP will return false on all input pairs in I as they have
been generated for another application (under another CRS which is dif-
ferent from capp.crsapp, the one used in BaseAppP in the game). However,
for ZecaleP to be true, this means that the check toDigestH,rw (vkHash) =
storage[“app crs”] (line 8 in the dispatch function in Fig. 5) was successful.
However, by looking at Fig. 4, we know that the value of xzec.vkHash is
constrained to equal to toFieldH,rw (H(a˜pp)) for xzec to be in L
zec. Hence,
assuming that Ψzec is sound, for ZecaleP to accept, it is necessary to
have toDigestH,rw (toFieldH,rw (H(a˜pp))) = H(capp), which by the defini-
tion of toDigestH,rw and toFieldH,rw means that H(a˜pp) = H(capp), where
capp 6= a˜pp. This implies that A needs to find a collision in H. We denote
the probability of this event by Advcoll-resA,H (λ).
C. pizec ← Ψzec.P(crszec, xzec, crsapp, {pii, xi}i∈[BATCH SIZE]), where {pii, xi}i∈[BATCH SIZE]
is a set containing only valid proof/instance pairs for capp. Further-
more, we set I ← {pii, x˜i}i∈[BATCH SIZE], where ∃j ∈ [BATCH SIZE], x˜j 6= xj
(i.e. one of the “nested” instance has been tampered with by the ag-
gregator after generating pizec). For ZecaleP to accept such input (which
is rejected by BaseAppP), the check xzec.xHj = toFieldH,rn(H(x˜j)) (lines
7-11 Fig. 6) needs to be satisfied. However, since xzec.xHj is constrained
to be equal to toFieldH,rn(H(xj)) (see Fig. 4), since toFieldH,rn is injective
and since x˜j 6= xj , then A broke the collision resistance of H.
Since both events E1 and E2 above are independent and since E2 is a conjunc-
tion of independent events, then the probability Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ] = Pr[E1 ]+Pr[E2 ]
which means that Advzcl-sndA,L (λ) = 0 +
(
Advsnark-sndA,Ψzec (λ) + 2 · Advcoll-resA,H (λ)
)
is neg-
ligible in λ.
uunionsq
Remark 2. We note that the hash function H used to hash the instances asso-
ciated to the “nested proofs” does not necessarily need to be the same hash
function as the one used the hash the verification key. It is perfectly feasible —
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and (maybe) in some contexts even desirable — to instantiate these hash func-
tions differently as long as both functions comply with the security requirements
mentioned above.
Remark 3. As observed by Duncan Tebbs [Teb20] it is necessary to check on
˜ZbaseAppC that the calling Zecale contract (i.e. ˜ZecaleC) is genuine in order
to be sure, on the application contract, that all the checks necessary to make
the protocol sound are properly carried out. Failure to check the address of the
calling contract would render the protocol vulnerable to a range of malicious
calling contracts.
5 Applications
In this section we present a few types of applications of Zecale, and conclude
by arguing that Zecale and privacy preserving solutions like ZETH can be used
as building blocks to implement blockchain-based digital cash systems.
We note that none of the applications discussed below are mutually exclusive
nor that they comprehensively represent the landscape of potential applications
of Zecale.
5.1 Application types 1: Blockchain users run the Zecale aggregator
locally
In this setting, the Zecale aggregator piece of software is ran on the network
users’ machines in order to aggregate their own batches of transactions locally.
Doing so allows users to save gas since only one transaction is sent on-chain,
and only one proof needs to be verified as part of the smart-contract execution.
Running Zecale locally to batch one’s transactions allows to save at most gSaved
gas:
gSaved = DGAS ·(BATCH SIZE−1)+BATCH SIZE ·VNProofGas−VWProofGas (1)
where DGAS is the intrinsic gas of a transaction, VNProofGas the gas necessary
to verify one nested proof, and VWProofGas is the gas necessary to verify the
wrapping proof.
Would batch verification make sense in this setting? In the context where Zecale
only aims to be used in this setting (i.e. as a way to equip network users with
a way to batch their transactions locally), it may be tempting to modify Rzec
in order to support batch verification of proofs. In fact, many of the practical
security issues discussed in Appendix B do not apply here anymore since all
proofs in the batch are generated by the user directly. However, since all nested
proofs are both generated and batch-verified (as part of the wrapping proof
generation) by the user, it is important, for the security of the system, to make
sure that a malicious user cannot craft a set of scalars in the batch verification
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equation Eq. (9) that could violate the soundness of the system. In other words,
it is necessary to make sure that the set of scalars used in the batch verification
equation are not under the prover’s control. While picking a set of random field
elements cannot be enforced using arithmetic gates, one may want to leverage
Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) as a way to deterministically derive a set
of random scalars from the set of proofs in the batch and add this derivation
process to Rzec. Further discussion on that is provided in Appendix A.
5.2 Application type 2: Blockchain miners run the Zecale
aggregator
Another application of Zecale consists in adding the aggregator software logic as
part of the block production on the blockchain. Doing so requires to make some
changes to the blockchain protocol – which in many cases, may not be desired –
but could however, lead to interesting scenarios and platform economics in which
miners are incentivized to aggregate transactions in the blocks they produce.
One such protocol modification may, for instance, consist in extending the block
production reward with an aggregation reward, and design a penalty that would
diminish the block production reward in the event where a block proposed by a
miner contains transactions that could have been aggregated. More drastically,
one may want to change the validity rules of a block [Woo, Section 4.3], by
enforcing that all blocks containing data that could have been aggregated via
Zecale, are deemed invalid on the network and thus rejected.
Such protocols would minimize data redundancy on-chain and would allow
to minimize the growth of data on the blockchain, at the cost of modifying the
base protocol.
5.3 Application type 3: Creation of an aggregation market
Finally, in this 3rd category of applications we argue that solutions such as
Zecale could be used to enrich the blockchain ecosystem by creating new eco-
nomic opportunities.
Privacy preserving solutions like ZETH allow to keep the value and the recip-
ient of a payment secret. Nevertheless, because of the need to pay for the gas of
the state transition, network users can observe when another user sends a ZETH
transaction (see [RZ19] for more discussions on this).
Despite this information leakage (i.e. Ethereum balances going “up and down”),
the transaction graph remains blurred (see [RZ19, Figure 2]). Users emitting
ZETH transactions cannot be associated to specific payments. Likewise, while
transaction unobservability is not achievable on a blockchain system (miners
and other network users can see the transactions in the system), we note that
the possibility to emit “dummy ZETH payments” – at the cost of paying the price
of the state transition – allows to create additional noise in the system in order
to achieve payment unobservability.
Nevertheless, this ability to detect when a user triggers a privacy preserving
state transition on the distributed state machine (whether it is a dummy payment
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or not) may prevent the deployment and adoption of solutions like ZETH in
countries where the use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) is prohibited.
Making sure to remove this information leakage is of tremendous importance for
the wide deployment of such solutions.
Below, we show how one could leverage solutions such as Zecale along with
the use of Anonymous Communication (AC) protocols like mix-networks in order
to bypass gas-related information leakages and hide the sender of transactions.
Anonymous communication protocols and sender anonymity. As above-
mentioned, solutions like ZETH allow to achieve recipient anonymity and re-
lationship anonymity (as defined in [PH09,BKM+16]). Unfortunately, sender
anonymity is not ensured by the protocol because of the need to pay gas to
execute state transition on the distributed state machine.
While removing the need to pay gas for each transaction on the blockchain
would undoubtedly remove some types of leakages and could ultimately be used
to allow transactions to be emitted from newly created accounts (with no funds)
as a way to gain sender anonymity; it is clear that such solution would expose
the system to a wide class of attacks – such a Denial of Services (DoS). Instead,
another way to obtain sender anonymity would be to leverage a network of relay
nodes that would listen to incoming messages/transactions and emit/relay them
on-chain. Such service could be rewarded by a relay fee.
Resorting to relay nodes as a way to gain sender anonymity by moving the
need to pay gas onto another entity is not without risk however. In addition
to the need to design a sound crypto-economic protocol and implementing the
right incentive structure to reward relays and keep the system secure; it is also
necessary to make sure that the system remains censorship resistant to make
sure that no malicious relay node can prevent transactions from being sent and
executed on-chain – even if deemed irrational by the incentive structure.
Interestingly, if a SNARK-based state transition only processes a zero-knowledge
SNARK proof along with the associated set of public inputs (that do not leak
the sender of the transaction) during its execution, it is possible to use anony-
mous communication protocols to simply route the zero-knowledge proof and the
instance to a relay. Routing such information using an anonymous network based
on onion routing [GRS99] (e.g. TOR [DMS10]) or mix-networks [Cha03,Adi06,SP06]
along with cryptographic packet format [DG09] (e.g. Loopix [PHE+17] or Nym [NYM19])
would protect the transaction originator from any malicious relays, and would
render any targeted censorship strategy inefficient (see Fig. 7).
Zecale as an aggregation proxy to scale SNARK-based blockchain ap-
plications. In addition to simply relay received zk-SNARK proofs on-chain, we
envision scenarios where relay nodes could also run the Zecale aggregator as
a way to compress the set of received proofs, into a single SNARK-proof to be
sent on-chain (see Fig. 8).
While relaying transactions allows transaction originators to become anony-
mous, aggregating received zk-SNARKs before relaying them on-chain allows
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Fig. 7: Simplified representation of an anonymity layer allowing to send proofs
anonymously to a relay
blockchain validators/miners to exchange and process less data. Like “honest
relaying”, “honest aggregation” of transactions should also be worth a fee that
could, for instance, be paid by blockchain miners to reward the aggregators for
their “data compression” work, which ultimately renders the blockchain system
more efficient.
Fig. 8: Simplified representation of an anonymity layer allowing to send proofs
anonymously to a relay running the Zecale aggregator
Aggregation market. While the design of specific incentive structures is de-
ferred for later work, we highlight that delegating the proof aggregation to a set
of relays on an “aggregation network” can pave the way for what we believe to
be interesting scenarios, where all relay/aggregators compete to process as many
zk-SNARK proof as possible in order to maximize their fees. Such competition
may be a driver for innovation as each aggregator operator would be incentivized
to implement state of the art SNARK proof generation algorithms running on
efficient hardware (e.g. GPU) in the hope to capture as much traffic as possible
on the aggregation network and generate profit.
Remark 4. We note that for blockchains based on Nakamoto-style consensus [Nak09],
block production work is intrinsically different from zk-SNARK proof produc-
tion. As such, we believe that the distinct roles of miners and aggregators are
very complementary and reflect the different nature of the computational tasks.
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Delegating the wrapping proof generation (i.e. the aggregation of zk-SNARK
proofs) to a set of aggregators seems to be a very natural model.
Toward the formation of “aggregation pools”? As we know that carrying out
Groth16 SNARK verification as part of proving that x ∈ Lzec is expensive
(i.e. pairings are expressed by large R1CS), we believe that new form of “pools”
(similar to mining pools) could emerge on the aggregation network. In fact, Wu
et al. [WZC+18] proposed DIZK, a system that distributes the generation of a
zero knowledge proof across machines in a compute cluster. Some blockchain
systems leveraging Zecale may be willing to maximize the size of the batch of
aggregated zk-SNARK proofs – i.e. maximize BATCH SIZE – in order to maximize
data compression and flatten the growth of the blockchain data. However, doing
so would significantly complicate the set of algebraic constraints representing
Rzec and increase the degrees of the interpolated polynomials manipulated dur-
ing the proof generation process. This could be compensated by the formation
of “aggregation pools” where a set of contributors could allocate some compute
resources to the generation of a wrapping proof, and be rewarded pro-rata the
resources allocated. We believe that further investigation of the formation of
aggregation pools is of great interest. However, we defer such study for later
work.
6 ZETH and Zecale as building blocks of digital cash
systems
Using ZETH as base application of Zecale as in Section 5.3 allows to gain sender
anonymity and diminish the amount of data sent and processed on-chain. As
mentioned in [CR20, Remark A.2.2], ZETH has been designed to be used in var-
ious setting, and the separate addressing scheme of the protocol [CR20, Section
1.4] allows to distinguish between users having an Ethereum account and those
with only a ZETH address. While Ethereum account holders can trigger arbitrary
state transitions, using Zecale along with ZETH is a way to expose the ZETH
state transition – to users holding only a ZETH address – through relay and ag-
gregator nodes. We believe that such mechanism is a step toward implementing
digital cash systems on blockchains like Ethereum, but stress that sound crypto-
economics are fundamental to keep the system secure. The possibility to retrieve
funds on the ZETH mixer in the form of a public output value is certainly a
mechanism that can be used to define such incentive structures.
A note on latency. An obvious drawback of composing protocols such as ZETH,
Zecale and Ethereum is the increased settlement latency (i.e. the time between
the emission of the transaction by the user and the processing of the trans-
action on-chain). In fact, it is clear that sending zk-SNARK proofs to a relay
node over an anonymous network in order to relay them on the blockchain adds
latency to execution of the state transition on the distributed state machine
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(i.e. blockchain). Any extra computation carried out on the relay node – like the
proof aggregation – increases this latency even more.
Importantly, high latency in the system may discourage users from using
it. As such, and in addition to aggressively optimizing their infrastructure and
software to generate wrapping proofs (see Section 5.3), operators of aggregation
nodes may be willing to pay high gas price to fasten the inclusion of their aggrega-
tion transactions in the blockchain. In a way that echoes and resembles [CST20],
operators of Zecale aggregator nodes would bid to maximize their chances to
see their aggregate transactions mined first on the chain. Such high gas price
may decrease the aggregation profits but could allow to capture more market
shares by offering lower latency access to the ZETH contract to carry out “fast”
cash payments.
6.1 Towards better cash
Today, cash still plays a fundamental role in the economy. Despite a decline in
the number of cash payments due to alternative and friction-less digital pay-
ment methods, cash remains hugely important, especially for the numerous “un-
banked” people [Cla18].
While transitioning to digital cash seems unavoidable, this transition presents
interesting opportunities but also numerous challenges ans risks [Tan96,DH16].
A digital cash system as described in Section 6 is secure, untraceable, dis-
tributed22, but does not, however, allow to carry out payments at no fees (which
is the case for cash). Nevertheless, not only exposing the ZETH state transition
via an anonymous aggregation network can grant restricted and secure access to
the distributed ledger to people that do not hold an account on the ledger (but
only a ZETH address), but it also makes it possible to implement Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) policies for cash payments by modifying the ZETH language
in order to (additionally) prove – in zero-knowledge – that a payment satisfies a
compliance predicate (without disclosing the payment details).
We believe that being able to securely grant wide access to the ZETH state
transition as well as cryptographically enforce financial regulatory policies is a
step toward solving some of the drawbacks of cash and could pave the way to
build a more efficient and secure but also more inclusive and stable economy.
7 Implementation
In this section we provide an overview of the software architecture of Zecale.
We invite the reader to consult the open-source project23 for more details on the
implementation.
22 the central counter-party processing the payments is replaced by a distributed ledger
23 https://github.com/clearmatics/zecale
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7.1 Ethereum client
As mentioned in Section 3.2, any pairing friendly cycle/amicable chain of elliptic
curves can be used in Zecale to generate the “wrapping” SNARK proof (over one
curve) certifying the correct verification of a set of “nested” zk-SNARK proofs
(generated over another curve). Unfortunately, the current version of Ethereum
does not offer the possibility to carry out arithmetic over a wide class of elliptic
curves24.
As of today, implementing Zecale requires to fork from Ethereum mainnet,
and add new precompiled contracts to support the BW6-761 pairing group op-
erations. Nevertheless, Ethereum Improvement Proposals such as [Vla19] may
change this situation and expose a wide class of pairing groups via precompiled
contracts.
Remark 5. Additional EIPs such as [ASB+19] have recently been incorporated
to the Ethereum protocol, making layer 2 scalability solutions like Zecale more
efficient.
7.2 Zecale aggregator
Following a similar software architecture as in ZETH [RZ19, Section 6], we de-
cided to implement the Zecale aggregator as a self-contained software compo-
nent written in C++ and using a modified version of the libsnark and libff
libraries25. This software component exposes a Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
interface allowing to receive zk-SNARK proofs to aggregate. The received zk-
SNARK proofs and corresponding instances are then added in an “application
pool” which represents the set of “nested” zk-SNARK proofs to aggregate for a
given SNARK-based application.
In addition to receive zk-SNARK proofs to aggregate, other endpoints have
been added to the Application Programming Interface (API) allowing to register
applications (i.e. deposit the crs associated to a given application), along with
the back-end logic to enable a Zecale aggregator to function across several
applications. A high-level representation of the software components composing
Zecale is provided Fig. 9.
7.3 Zecale contract
A pseudo-code of the smart-contract logic is provided Fig. 6. To be deployed on
Ethereum, such contract can be implemented using the Solidity programming
language26 for instance.
24 Only arithmetic over BN-254 and BLS12-381 is exposed via precompiled con-
tracts at the time of writing: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/blob/
0c82928981028e8b32b5852c38b095d2e0d26b04/core/vm/contracts.go#L83
25 see https://github.com/clearmatics/libsnark and https://github.com/
clearmatics/libff
26 https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.7.0/
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Fig. 9: An overview of the architecture and flow of function calls for Zecale
We note that, as previously mentioned, an explicit check — verifying that
all received nested instances lie in the right finite field — is done by the ap-
plication contract in Zecale. This check is kept on the smart-contract rather
than “moved” as an extra constraint in Rzec for efficiency reasons. In fact,
ZecaleRelation is defined over the scalar field Frw of BW6-761 which is also the
base field of BLS12-377. That means that all variables/wires manipulated in the
algebraic representation of the Zecale NP-relation are defined over Frw , while the
“nested instances” are defined over the scalar field Frn of BLS12-377. As such,
for a given x, checking that x ∈ Frn in ZecaleRelation incurs a non-negligible
overhead due to the characteristic mismatch of the two scalar field, i.e.rw 6= rn.
Hence, to bypass the necessity to provably carry out an expensive range-check
on the instance, we decided to keep this check on the application smart-contract.
Importantly, since any entry in a set of “nested instances” lying outside of the
field Frn will cause the Zecale state transition to abort, implementers of Zecale
aggregator services may — at their will — decide to carry out this membership
test on “nested instances” before accepting the incoming (pi, x) pair from a user.
As such, all requests containing “nested instances” that are not elements of Frn
will be deemed invalid and end up being rejected by the aggregation service.
Alternatively, the smart-contract logic (as illustrated Fig. 6 and Fig. 5) can be
modified to ignore/skip instances failing to satisfy the field membership test,
without aborting.
Finally, we note that elements of the base field of BLS12-377 and of the
base and scalar field of BW6-761 have a binary representation that exceeds the
256-bit word length of the Ethereum (stack-based) Virtual Machine (EVM). As
such, representing elements of such fields requires multiple entries on the stack,
which makes manipulating such elements relatively expensive gas-wise. As such,
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implementers may want to allocate some time to optimize the implementation
of costly operations of the Zecale smart-contract27, or may want to implement
additional precompiled contracts to carry out costly operations natively on the
client.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we presented Zecale, a general purpose SNARK proof aggrega-
tor allowing to scale SNARK-based applications on Ethereum. We explained
how Zecale works and showed that multiple applications could benefit from it.
Likewise, various new types of applications and new market opportunities could
emerge from this work, and we believe that Zecale and blockchain-based privacy
preserving protocols constitute valuable building blocks for digital cash systems.
Importantly, while Zecale diminishes the data sent and processed on-chain,
and thus, makes SNARK-based applications more scalable, we emphasize that
this work is not “the” solution to on-chain scalability, but is rather what we
believe to be a step toward building more scalable systems.
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A A note on batch verification
We start by defining the notion of batch SNARK verification by adapting the
definition of batch verification of signatures from Camenisch, Hohenberger and
Pedersen [CHP12].
Definition 1 (Batch verification of SNARKs). Let λ be the security pa-
rameter and R be an NP-relation which associated language is L. Suppose Ψ =
(KGen,P,V,Sim) is a SNARK scheme, n ∈ poly(λ), and let crs ← Ψ.KGen(R).
We call probabilistic VBATCH, a batch verification algorithm where the following
conditions hold:
Batch-Completeness:
Ψ.V(crs, xj ,wj) = true ,∀j ∈ [n]
⇒ VBATCH(crs, (x0,w0), . . . , (xn−1,wn−1)) = true
Batch-Soundness:
Pr
[
VBATCH(crs, (x0,w0), . . . , (xn−1,wn−1))
= true
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ j ∈ [n] s.t.V(crs, xj ,wj) = false
]
≤ negl(λ)
36 Antoine Rondelet
A.1 Intuition behind the soundness of batching.
In [BGR98] Bellare et al. present a set of probabilistic checks to perform fast
batch verification for modular exponentiation and digital signatures. Later, Fer-
rara et al. [FGHP09] and Blazy et al. [BFI+10] proposed batching methods in
pairing-based settings.
Similar methods can be used to batch verify a set SNARKs generated for the
same language (i.e. a set of SNARKs generated under the same crs). As such,
instead of checking a set of N proofs separately by running N times the verifi-
cation algorithm, a single equation can be used to decide whether all SNARKs
in the set are valid. If the batch verification equation is not satisfied, this means
that at least one proof in the set is not valid.
As such it is possible to transform system of verification equations, as below,
into a single probabilistic check (we further assume here that the algorithm
Ψ.V() can be fully represented by a single check that tests that an equation -
Veq - equals 0 if the proof is valid).
Ψ.Veq(crs, x0, pi0)(
?
= 0)
Ψ.Veq(crs, x1, pi1)(
?
= 0)
. . .
Ψ.Veq(crs, xN−1, piN−1)(
?
= 0)
(2)
Indeed, representing the system of equations in Eq. (2) as a vector defined
over a vector space, informally allows to “isolate” each proof verification into
“its own dimension”. In fact, Π can be obtained by decomposition in term of
the standard basis of the vector space, i.e. :
Π = f0 ·

1
0
...
0
+ . . .+ fN−1 ·

0
...
0
1
 (3)
where fi = Ψ.Veq(crs, xi, pii),∈ Fr.
Since B =


1
0
...
0
 , . . . ,

0
...
0
1

 is a basis of the vector space V, and by definition
of a basis, we know that by the linear independence property of the vectors
forming a vector space basis, Π = 0 ⇒ fi = 0,∀i ∈ [N ], i.e. all proofs are
correct.
While checking if Π = 0 can be done by checking all coordinates of Π,
which corresponds to checking each individual proofs one by one, it is possible
to fasten this check by applying a linear transformation T : (Fr)N → Fr defined
as: Mx, where M =
[
m0, . . . ,mN−1
]
is a 1 × N matrix defined over Fr such
that ∃ i ∈ [N ] s.t. mi 6= 0, and x =
[
x0, . . . , xN−1
]> ∈ V.
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Applying this linear transformation on Π allows to “project the vector to
the number line” and simply check that the transformation input is mapped to
0 by doing a single check. Trivially, x = 0 =
[
0, 0, . . . , 0
]> ∈ (Fr)N is mapped to
0 by T . However, Ker(T ) = {(x0, . . . , xN−1) ∈ V | m0x0 + . . . + mN−1xN−1 =
0 mod r} 6= {0} (i.e. Ker(T ) ⊃ {0}, but Ker(T ) * {0}). In fact, reducing
the dimensions of the space via the transform T breaks the “one check ↔ one
dimension” idea above-mentioned, and it is now important to make sure that no
adversary can forge a vector Π such that Π ∈ Ker(T ) \ {0}, i.e. its projection
by the linear transformation above yields the origin of the number line. This
would violate the batch-soundness property (see Definition 1).
To measure the likelihood for an adversary to hold a vector of SNARK proof
that violates the soundness of the batch equation, it is necessary to estimate the
number of solutions of the equation:
m0x0 + . . .+mN−1xN−1 = 0 mod r (4)
, where mi’s and xi’s ∈ Fr. As the linear functional T is assumed to be non-
trivial, we know that Ker(T ) ⊂ V. However, knowing how smaller the kernel of
the linear functional is compared to the source vector space is crucial to prove
the soundness of batching.
Intuitively, given T , the equation Eq. (4) holds if either all terms are equal
to 0, or if 2 terms - out of the N terms - “cancel each other”, i.e. are additive
inverse in the field, or if 3 terms “cancel each other” etc. This means that the
number of solutions of Eq. (4) is bounded by the sum of binomial coefficients,
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
= 2N
As we now know that |Ker(T )| < 2N , ∀T ←$V, where V is the set of
elements in the algebraic dual space of V minus the trivial map Tt (where
Ker(Tt) = V), on challenge a random - non-trivial - linear functional, the prob-
ability for an adversary A (who previously committed to his vector of proofs -
to “kill” adaptivity) to hold a vector of proofs such that it falls in Ker(T ) is:
|Ker(T )|
|V| <
2N
(|Fr|)N
<
(
2
r
)N
If r is a large prime such that r is encoded on λ bits (i.e. r > 2λ), the
probability that the vector of proofs held by the prover lies in the kernel of the
challenged linear functional is bounded by
(
2
2λ
)N
= 1
2N(λ−1) , which is negligible
in λ.28
28 We can also use [Sch74, Lemma 1] to bound |Ker(T )| (described as the set of solu-
tions of a multivariate polynomial of degree 1) by rn−1, and show that the probability
to have a vector that lies in Ker(T ) is bounded by rn−1
rn
= 1
r
< 1
2λ
.
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Modeling proof-batching as an interactive protocol. Below, we model
proofs batching as an interactive protocol between a prover and a verifier. Infor-
mally, the prover has a vector of SNARKs and wants to show the verifier that
all proofs are valid.
We follow the same structure as a sigma protocol [Dam10], where the prover
wants to convince the verifier that he holds a vector of valid SNARKs (and
associated public inputs) for a given language - represented by its crs - which we
assume to be available by all parties in the protocol. First, the prover commits to
his set of pairs of proofs and associated public inputs, by sending a commitment
to the verifier, then the verifier samples a challenge at random from the challenge
space, and the prover answers this challenge. At the end of the protocol, the
verifier either accepts or rejects.
The protocol is summarized below - where Πi = (pii, xi) ∀i ∈ [N ]:
Interactive protocol for SNARK proof batching
Prover crs← Ψ.KGen(R) Verifier
c← Commit(Π)
c
T ←$V
T
res← T
([
Ψ.Veq(crs, Π0), . . .
]>)
res
Decide(c, T , res)
Applying Fiat-Shamir to remove interactions. In most cases, the vector Π
of proofs and primary inputs is held by an aggregator or verifier, and is built as
the set of received proof/inputs from a set of provers. As such, the (batch) verifier
is not one of the initial prover who generated one of the proofs in the batch. We
are interested here, in the case where this distinction does not apply anymore,
and where the batch verifier is one of the provers who initially generated a proof
in the batch.
We consider the interactive protocol above, and make it non-interactive by
using the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS86,PS96,BPW12], which yields the following
- non-interactive - protocol:
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Non-interactive protocol for SNARK proof batching
Prover crs← Ψ.KGen(R) Verifier
c← Commit(Π)
T ← GenChallenge(c)
res← T
([
Ψ.Veq(crs, Π0), . . .
]>)
res
Decide(c, T , res)
Here the verifier’s challenge is derived by the prover from the first message
sent in the interactive protocol. We note that the derivation of T can be done by
calling a Random Oracle (RO) N times to obtain each entry of the line matrix
M , representing T , where each mi of M is obtained as mi ← RO(c||i). However,
doing so, requires to call the RO N times, which may not be desired. As such,
one may want to derive M as m0 ← RO(c), and derive the other mi, i ∈ [N ] \ 0
as mi ← mi+10 . Now, the equation that determines the kernel of the linear
transformation becomes a univariate polynomial of degree at most N , which, as
we know by the (DeMillo-Lipton-)Schwartz-Zippel lemma [DL78,Zip79,Sch80],
has at most N roots. In fact, we would have:
Ker(T ) = {(x0, . . . , xN−1) ∈ V | x0m0 + x1m20 + . . .+ xN−1mN0 = 0 mod r}
which can be modeled as the set of all roots of the polynomial of degree N
which coefficients are (x0, . . . , xN−1). Schwartz-Zippel tell us that such polyno-
mial has at most N roots, as such, the only way for the equation to be satisfied
(and the batch verification check to be accepted) is either,
1. to sample a challenge RO(c) that lends in the set of roots of the polynomial
determined by the prover’s input vector. The probability of this event is
N
|Fr| which is negligible for low degree polynomials - N  r (we note that
N  r will always be satisfied in applied settings, as carrying out a batch
SNARK verification on N ≈ r SNARKs would be prohibitively expensive.
Alternative protocols such as [BMMV19] would be more efficient to generate
the “wrapping proof” at the expense of having a log-sized proof with a log-
time verifier), or
2. for the prover’s polynomial to be the 0 polynomial (i.e. for all his proofs to
be valid - all checks pass and all entries in the vector defining the polynomial
are 0)
Importantly, the malicious prover who tries to violate the soundness of the
batch verification, by continuously sampling a new vector of proofs and the cor-
responding challenge until the batch verification pass while the batch is invalid,
does not have a probability higher than N/|Fr| to succeed since all these events
are independent. In fact, by re-running the protocol in the hope to violate the
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batch-soundness, the prover generates a new set of proofs and thus a new poly-
nomial to evaluate after receiving the challenge from the random oracle (which
output is unpredictable by the prover). Hence, the prover cannot evaluate the
same polynomial at multiple points.
All the operations carried out by the prover in the non-interactive protocol
above may be added to Rzec in order to be “carried out in the SNARK”.
A.2 Batch verification equation for Groth16.
We know that the verification routine ran by V in [Gro16] consists in checking
if Eq. (5) holds.
e(pi.A, pi.B)
?
= e(vk.α, vk.β) ∗ e(Γ, vk.γ) ∗ e(pi.C, vk.δ) (5)
where
Γ =
∑
i∈[|x|]
xi
vk.β · ui(x) + vk.α · vi(x) + wi(x)
vk.γ
Carrying out this check requires the verifier to compute 4 pairings along with
|x| scalar multiplications (i.e. a scalar multiplication for each primary input in
x).
Using batch verification allows to save a few pairing operations for the veri-
fication of multiple SNARKs.
Applying the reasoning described in the first section of Appendix A.1, we
can represent a set of Groth16 proof verification equations

A1B1 = αβ + γΓ1 + δC1
A2B2 = αβ + γΓ2 + δC2
. . .
ANBN = αβ + γΓN + δCN
⇔

A1B1 − αβ − γΓ1 − δC1 = 0
A2B2 − αβ − γΓ1 − δC2 = 0
. . .
ANBN − αβ − γΓN − δCN = 0
(6)
as a vector Π defined over the vector space V = (Fr)N , where r is the prime
order of G1,G2, and GT :
Π =

A1B1 − αβ − γΓ1 − δC1
A2B2 − αβ − γΓ1 − δC2
...
ANBN − αβ − γΓN − δCN
 (7)
and batch verify the set of underlying proofs. The goal of the verifier is to
check that Π is equal to 0.
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Groth16 batched - unrolled. We can transform this set of equations into a single
equation, by applying a random linear functional T , represented by a line matrix
of random scalars M =
[
m0, . . . ,mN−1
]
, and checking that the result is 0 ∈ Fr,
i.e. checking that T (Π) = MΠ = 0 ∈ Fr. After applying the group encoding on
field elements and denoting by vk (“verification key”) the part of the crs used
by the verifier, the batch verification check becomes:
∏
i∈[N ]
e(pii.A, pii.B)
mi ?=
∏
i∈[N ]
[e(vk.α, vk.β) ∗ e(Γi, vk.γ) ∗ e(pii.C, vk.δ)]mi (8)
Which gives:
∏
i∈[N ]
e (mi · pii.A, pii.B) ?= e
(∑
i∈[N ]mi · vk.α, vk.β
)
∗e
(
Γ˜ , vk.γ
)
∗e
(∑
i∈[N ]mi · pii.C, vk.δ
)
(9)
where:
Γ˜ =
∑
j∈[|x|]
[vk.β · uj(x) + vk.α · vj(x) + wj(x)] (
∑
i∈[N ]mi · xj)
vk.γ
In contrast with Eq. (5), the batch verification equation Eq. (9) requires
N + 3 pairings (instead of 4×N) along with 1 + |x|+ 2N scalar multiplications
(instead of N × |x|) to verify N SNARKs. As such, a few pairing computations
are removed at the expense of more scalar multiplications, which as we know,
are significantly cheaper to carry out.
B Practical considerations of SNARK batching
While it is possible to batch verify a set of nested proofs in Zecale, one needs to
understand the limitations of such technique. In fact, batch verification presents
some challenges related forgeries detection in batches, which can ultimately,
significantly slow the system down.
B.1 Forgery detection.
As above-mentioned, the batch verification equation for Groth16 can be used to
efficiently check that all entries in a set of SNARKs are valid. In other words, the
batch verification method detects the presence of forgeries in a set of SNARKs.
Nevertheless, while a failing batch verification exposes the presence of forgeries
in the set of inputs, it does not allow to identify which input - in the set - is a
forgery. While a trivial way to identify forgeries consists in verifying all inputs
individually, being able to identify forgeries in a batch efficiently is non-trivial
and has lead to various work.
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While “divide-and-conquer” approaches such as the one proposed by Pas-
tuszak et al. [PMPS00] can be used to converge toward forgeries in the set
of inputs, we note that this method introduces an important overhead on the
system. Later, Law and Matt [LM07,Mat09] proposed an improved forgery iden-
tification protocol for pairing-based signatures, improving on the initial design
of binary-tree search methods.
While studying SNARK forgery identification is out of scope of this work,
we note that carrying out forgery identification upon invalid SNARK batch
verification gives a leverage to an adversary A who can send a low volume of
SNARK forgeries to the aggregator, enough to have one forgery in each batch,
in order to cause a severe slow down in the system [BDLO12].
As such, some care needs to be taken before considering using batch SNARK
verification as an optimization in protocols like Zecale.
B.2 Processing and verifying invalid proofs.
For systems like Zecale, where an aggregator piece of software receives a set of
proofs and relays the result of their aggregation on-chain, it may be desired to
process invalid proofs. In fact, settling a transaction containing an invalid proof
on a blockchain system acts as a proof that the transaction has been processed
- and not censored. As such, even if a SNARK does not verify successfully on an
aggregator, one may still want to send the result of this erroneous verification
on-chain to show the progress of the system, and to inform the transaction
originator that the transaction has been processed and added on-chain.
